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Abstract—One way of designing a robust machine learning
algorithm is to generate authentic adversarial images which can
trick the algorithms as much as possible. In this study, we propose
a new method to generate adversarial images which are very
similar to true images, yet, these images are discriminated from
the original ones and are assigned into another category by the
model. The proposed method is based on a popular concept
of experimental psychology, called, Just Noticeable Difference.
We define Just Noticeable Difference for a machine learning
model and generate a least perceptible difference for adversarial
images which can trick a model. The suggested model iteratively
distorts a true image by gradient descent method until the
machine learning algorithm outputs a false label. Deep Neural
Networks are trained for object detection and classification tasks.
The cost function includes regularization terms to generate just
noticeably different adversarial images which can be detected
by the model. The adversarial images generated in this study
looks more natural compared to the output of state of the art
adversarial image generators.
Index Terms—Adversarial Image, Adversarial Attack, CNN,
Regularization, Just Noticeable Difference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, systems using Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN) have emerged in many cutting-edge products. Unfor-
tunately, most of the CNN based image classifiers or object
detectors are not secure enough against deceptions. In order to
prevent these deceptions, generating as many deceiving images
as possible is very crucial.
In this paper, we suggest a method to generate authen-
tic adversarial images, which successfully trick a machine
learning algorithm. The suggested method is inspired from
the concept of Just Noticeable Difference (JND). We adopt
JND to machine perception by defining the least amount of
change in an image to cheat a machine learning algorithm.
After we introduce the formal definition of JND for machines,
we gradually distort the image by a CNN to detect the least
perceptible difference. Basically, the suggested method selects
an image from a category and progressively updates it using a
gradient descent based optimization algorithm until the CNN
model detects the change and assigns it to another category.
The resulting adversarial image can be considered as the just
noticeably different image from the machine perspective.
The main contribution of this paper is to formalize the
concept of Just Noticeable difference by a set of regularization
techniques to generate adversarial images that look authentic
and relatively noise free. The generated adversarial images
not only cheat the machines, but also they can cheat humans,
thus, look quite natural compared to the outputs of popular
adversarial image generators. This study, also, points out that
for a machine learning system, the concept of JND is quite
different than human perception.
II. RELATED WORK
In most cases, humans cannot recognize the changes in the
adversarial example, but the classifier misclassifies it. Kurakin
et. al., in [1] state that even in the physical world scenarios,
adversarial examples are still a threat to classifiers. They
show this problem by using adversarial examples, which are
obtained from a cell phone camera. They feed these adversarial
examples to an ImageNet pre-trained Inception classifier and
measure the accuracy of the classifier. They observe that most
of the adversarial examples are misclassified.
A recent study of Sheikh et. al. found some intriguing
properties of neural networks [2]. For example, the adversarial
examples generated on ImageNet were so similar to the
original ones, even the human eye failed to distinguish them.
Interestingly, some of the adversarial examples, also, got mis-
classified by other classifiers that had different architectures or
they are even trained on different subsets of the training data.
These findings sadly suggest that deep learning classifiers,
even the ones that obtain superior performances on the test
set, are not actually learning the true underlying patterns that
determine the correct output label. Instead, these algorithms
have built a model that works well on naturally occurring
data, but fail miserably for the data that do not have a high
probability in the data distribution.
In [3], Papernot et. al. states that all existing adversarial
example attacks require knowledge of either the model inter-
nals or its training data. They introduce a practical method
of an attacker, controlling a remotely hosted DNN. The only
capability of the black-box adversary generator is to observe
labels given by the DNN to chosen inputs.
III. JUST NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCE FOR MACHINE
PERCEPTION
In experimental psychology, Just Noticeable Difference
(JND) is defined as the least amount of change on some
sensory stimuli in order to detect the change. In this study,
we adopt this concept to machine perception, where machine
detects the change on the input image and decides that this is
different from the original image.
Let us start by defining the concept of Just Noticeable
Difference (JND) for a Machine Learning system. This is
a critical step to generate an adversarial image from a real
image, which confounds a machine learning algorithm. The
adversarial image with the least perceptible difference, in
which the network discriminates the true image from the
adversarial image is called just noticeably different adversarial
image.
Formally speaking, Just Noticeably Different adversarial
image can be defined as follows: Suppose that a machine
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learning system M , generates a true label y for image x,
i.e. M(x) = y. Suppose, also, that image x is distorted
gradually by adding an incremental noise n(k) to generate
an image x(k + 1) = x(k) + n(k) at iteration k + 1, where
x = x(0). Assure that M(x(k)) = y for all k= 1,...., K-1 and
M(x(k)) 6= y for k ≥ K. x(K) is called the Just Noticeably
Different (JND) adversarial image.
Note that K is the smallest number of iterations, where
the machine notices the difference between the original image
and the adversarial image. Note also that, the image generated
at iteration K, is the least detectable difference from the true
image x by M, because; for all the generated images, x(k) for
k ≤ K − 1, M(x(k)) = y. The rest of the images x(k) for k
≥ K are adversarial, i.e. M(x(k)) 6= y.
IV. GENERATING THE ADVERSARIAL IMAGE BY JUST
NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCE
In order to generate an adversarial image with Just No-
ticeable Difference, JND(M), for a machine M , we adopt
the CNN architecture, suggested by Gatys et. al. [4] for style
detection. In their approach, they start from a random noise
image and update it, so that the style of the image is captured.
In our suggested method, we start from an original image x,
which can be correctly classified by a model M and update it
until the network notices the difference between the original
image and the distorted image, in other words, we distort x(k)
until M(x(k)) 6= y.
The input image x(k) at each iteration is distorted by the
gradient descent method to generate a slightly more noisy
image, so that the model output can no longer generate the
true label.
We generate just noticeably different adversarial images for
two different machine learning tasks. The first one is image
classification and the second one is object detection task. In
the image classification task, we tried to correctly classify the
image as we distort it. For the object detection task, we used
two approaches. In the first approach, we tried to match the
output of the model to the bounding box coordinates and object
class. In the second approach, we just matched the object class
in a bounding box.
A. Cost Function
The most crucial part of the suggested method is defining
a cost function, which assures that the generated adversarial
image is as close as possible to the true image, while mini-
mizing the loss function between the true label and assigned
label. The cost function we propose has three regularization
terms in addition to the loss function between the true label
and the label generated by the model, as defined below:
Cost(x(k)) = Loss(yˆ, y) + λ||x(k)− x(0)||2+
BR(x(k)) + TV (x(k)), (1)
where x = x(0) is the input image, x(k) is the updated
adversarial image at the iteration k, yˆ is the output of the
model given the updated adversarial image, x(k), y is the true
output of the model. The first term, Loss is the loss function
depending on the model we are tricking. For example, if the
task is image classification, we can use cross-entropy loss.
By adding three regularization terms to the loss term, we try
to capture the Just Noticeable Difference for the model. The
first regularization term which measures the distance between
the original image and the updated image, ensures that the
updated image is as close as possible to the original image.
The other two terms which are Bounded Range loss, BR, and
Total Variation loss, TV , ensures the natural appearance of
the images as will be explained in the next subsections.
After we calculate the cost from equation 1, we update the
input image by using gradient descent. We use the following
formula for update the adversarial image.
x(k + 1)← x(k)− αδCost(x(k))
δx(k)
(2)
where x(k) is the updated adversarial image at iteration k,
α is the learning rate, Cost is the function defined in the
equation 1. Note that the second term in the above equation
corresponds to the noise n(k) added to the original image at
each iteration:
n(k) = −αδCost(x(k))
δx(k)
. (3)
Just Noticeable Difference for a model M is, then, defined
as,
JND(M) = ||x(0)− x(K)||/x(0), (4)
where the model detects the incremental change in the gener-
ated image x(K) for the first time, at iteration K and outputs
a false label.
B. Regularization Techniques
The second term of the cost of function, L2 distance
between the adversarial image and the original image is
added so that the updated image is as close as possible to
the original image. We use L2 regularization term in all
experiments because without using it, the adversarial image
diverges from the original image. The third and forth terms of
the cost function, namely, bounded range, and total variation
is added to assure the natural appearance of the generated
adversarial images. Mahedran. et. al [5] showed that these
techniques make a random image look more natural. Bounded
Range loss simply penalizes pixels with higher intensities
than maximum intensity and lower intensities than minimum
intensity. Therefore, image stays in the range of 0 to 255.
Total Variation loss makes image pixels’ intensities same as
their neighbors so that some surfaces become visible.
1) Bounded Range: In this regularization technique, a pixel
is penalized if it has an intensity which is not in the natural
image intensity range. We use the below formula for each
pixel of the image. A natural image must consist of pixels with
intensities with minimum 0 and maximum 255. Therefore, we
penalizes each pixels which are not obeying this constraint.
BR(p) =

−p p ≤ 0
p− 255 p ≥ 255
0 otherwise
(5)
Fig. 1: Experiments in ImageNet dataset: First row: Samples
from original images. Second row: Just Noticeably Differ-
ent Adversarial Images with using regularization functions
at the time when they first trick the network. Third row:
Samples generated by regularization functions at the end of
the generation. Bottom row: Samples generated without any
regularization. All the samples trick classifiers successfully.
where p is intensity of the pixel. This function is applied to
each pixel of the image to assure that all the pixel values of
the image is in the range of [0 - 255].
2) Total Variation: In natural images, a pixel has a ”sim-
ilar” intensity value with its neighbors. This property can be
partially simulated by total variation regularization technique.
In this technique, a pixel is penalized if it does not have the
”similar” intensity with its neighbors. Therefore, we penalize
the image to force all pixels to have similar intensity values
with their neighbors. We use the below formula to penalize
the variation among pixels;
TV =
1
HW
∑
uvk
[(x(v, u+ 1, k)− x(v, u, k))2+
(x(v + 1, u, k)− x(v, u, k))2], (6)
where H and W are height and width respectively, u,v,k
are values to iterate over the dimensions height, width, and
depth.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate that the suggested method
generates adversarial images, which are indistinguishable to
human eye in high resolution images, are capable of tricking
the models. We conduct experiments in ImageNet, CIFAR10
Fig. 2: The confidence scores of the updated bear and rooster
images, after K=509 and 561, respectively, the images success-
fully trick the network. Therefore, Just Noticeably Different
Adversarial image is generated at K=509 and 561, respectively.
Y-axis shows the confidence score, in 0-1 scale and X-axis
shows the number of iterations
and MS COCO data sets in two different machine learning
tasks, namely image classification and object detection. First,
we generate JND adversarial images to trick a pre-trained
Inception v3 image classifier on ImageNet and CIFAR10.
Second, we generate JND adversarial images to trick ResNet
object detector. In order to examine the power and weaknesses
of the suggested method, we illustrate some of the generated
images. We, also, measured some image quality metrics to
make a numerical comparisons between the original images
and the generated images.
The results indicate that using the suggested regularization
techniques in a relatively high resolution dataset, such as
ImageNet, we observe a substantial increase in the natural-
ness of the adversarial image. However, in a relatively low
resolution dataset, such as CIFAR10, regularizations does not
significantly improve the quality of generated images. We,
also, verify this observation by image quality metrics [9]–[12].
We use pre-trained Inception v3 model [6] for classification
experiments, and RetinaNet [7] trained on MS COCO [8] for
object detection experiments.
A. Classification Experiments on ImageNet
We generate 3 different sets of adversarial images which can
successfully trick image classifiers. The first set consists of the
Just Noticeably Different adversarial image generated with all
the regularization terms. This is the image set that tricks the
network for the smallest iteration number K. The second set
of adversarial images are generated at the final step of the
iterations. The third set of adversarial images are generated
with no regularization.
Note that, using regularization significantly increases the
naturalness of the generated images. This result shows that
regularization is very effective in high resolution images (at
least 224x224). The generated images can be seen in Figure
1. While increasing the quality of images, using regularization
does not decrease the confidence of the classification. The
classifier wrongly classifies all the generated images with
99% confidence. In Figure 2, we report the confidence scores
of the generated images. After iteration K, all the generated
adversarial images trick the network successfully.
In Table I, we report the image quality assessments of the
generated examples. The quality of the images are higher,
when regularization techniques are employed.
Fig. 3: Generated images to trick the object detector. On the left, original image, in the middle, generated image without
regularization, on the right, generated image with regularization, i.e., Just Noticeably Different Adversarial Image.
Metrics With Without
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio [9] 370 350
Universal Image Quality Index [10] 0.99 0.90
Spatial Correlation Coefficient [11] 0.85 0.21
Visual Information Fidelity [12] 0.99 0.95
TABLE I: First column shows the image quality metrics,
the second and third columns are the measures obtained
with regularization and without regularization cost functions,
respectively. For [9], [11], [12], the maximum value is 1.0 and
for [10], the higher, the better. We report the average values
of the metrics calculated over the 10 generated examples in
ImageNet dataset.
Fig. 4: Experiments in CIFAR10 dataset: Top row: Original
images. Middle row: JND adversarial images, generated with
regularization. Bottom row: Adversarial images generated
without any regularization. All of the examples successfully
trick the classifier.
B. Classification Experiments on CIFAR10 Dataset
We generated 8 different adversarial images, half with the
regularization techniques and the other half without regular-
ization techniques. All of the generated images successfully
tricked the classifier. Using regularization does not signifi-
cantly affect the results, since the resolution of the images is
32x32. The generated images can be seen in Figure 4. Visual
comparison shows that images generated with regularization
are slightly better that the images generated without regular-
ization.
We report the same image quality assessment metrics for
the generated images in the Table II. The image quality
scores are similar for generated images with and without using
regularization. According to these results, we can conclude
that resolution of the images is an important parameter for
generation of high quality adversarial images.
Metrics With Without
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio [9] 341.14 341.21
Universal Image Quality Index [10] 0.68 0.75
Spatial Correlation Coefficient [11] 0.06 0.06
Visual Information Fidelity [12] 0.12 0.10
TABLE II: The left part is with regularization and the right
part is without regularization. For [9], [11], [12], the maximum
value is 1.0 and for [10], the higher, the better. We report the
average values of the metrics calculated over the 10 generated
examples in CIFAR10 dataset.
C. Adversarial Image Generation for Object Detection
For the object detection task, we used Retina-Net, which
is pre-trained on Microsoft COCO [8]. We use a simple
road image which can be seen in the Figure 3 and update
it iteratively to generate an adversarial example, which tricks
the classifier in a way that the classifier sees a car in the middle
of the image. We have generated two different adversarial
examples from the starting road image on the left in the
Figure 3. In the middle one, we did not use any regularization
techniques. Therefore, the output adversarial examples has a
noise which can be detected by humans. We also generate an
adversarial example by adding regularization terms, which is
capable of tricking the network.
Both of the generated adversarial examples successfully
trick the Retina-Net object detector. Although there is no car
in the middle of the image, both examples generate a car at
the output of the model. The confidences for the middle image
is 89%, whereas the confidence for the image in the right is
91%.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we propose a new method for generating ad-
versarial images which is almost indistinguishable by humans,
yet can successfully trick a machine learning algorithm based
on Convolutional Neural Networks. For this purpose, we adopt
the concept of Just Noticeable Difference (JND) of human
perception to machine perception and we define just noticeably
different adversarial images for models. Then, we formalize
JND concept for machines by adding a set of regularization
term into the cost function of the network.
We used three different data sets, namely, Imagenet, CI-
FAR10 and MS COCO to train classification and object
detection models. The generated JND adversarial images can
successfully trick a pre-trained Inception v3 image classifier
and a RetinaNet object detector. We report the image quality
metrics for generated JND images. According to our results,
JND adversarial images look very authentic compared to
the state of the art image generators, specifically when high
resolution images are used.
In the future, Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
can be used to generate adversarial images. JND adversarial
images will be generated by training a GAN in which an
original image will be fed as an input to the generator and
will be distorted gradually to trick the discriminator.
REFERENCES
[1] Kurakin A, Goodfellow I, Bengio S. Adversarial examples in the
physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533. 2016 Jul 8.
[2] Szegedy C, Zaremba W, Sutskever I, Bruna J, Erhan D, Goodfellow
I, Fergus R. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199. 2013 Dec 21.
[3] Papernot N, McDaniel P, Goodfellow I, Jha S, Celik ZB, Swami A.
Practical black-box attacks against machine learning. In Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM on Asia conference on computer and communications
security 2017 Apr 2 (pp. 506-519). ACM.
[4] Gatys LA, Ecker AS, Bethge M. Image style transfer using convolutional
neural networks. InProceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition 2016 (pp. 2414-2423).
[5] Mahendran A, Vedaldi A. Visualizing deep convolutional neural net-
works using natural pre-images. International Journal of Computer
Vision. 2016 Dec 1;120(3):233-55.
[6] Szegedy, C., Vanhoucke, V., Ioffe, S., Shlens, J., & Wojna, Z. (2016).
Rethinking the inception architecture for computer vision. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition
(pp. 2818-2826).
[7] Lin TY, Goyal P, Girshick R, He K, Dollr P. Focal loss for dense
object detection. InProceedings of the IEEE international conference
on computer vision 2017 (pp. 2980-2988).
[8] Lin TY, Maire M, Belongie S, Hays J, Perona P, Ramanan D, Dollr P,
Zitnick CL. Microsoft coco: Common objects in context. In European
conference on computer vision 2014 Sep 6 (pp. 740-755). Springer,
Cham.
[9] Huynh-Thu Q, Ghanbari M. Scope of validity of PSNR in image/video
quality assessment. Electronics letters. 2008 Jun 19;44(13):800-1.
[10] Wang Z, Bovik AC. A universal image quality index. IEEE signal
processing letters. 2002 Aug 7;9(3):81-4.
[11] Wald, Lucien. ”Quality of high resolution synthesised images: Is there
a simple criterion?.” 2000.
[12] Sheikh HR, Bovik AC. Image information and visual quality. IEEE
Transactions on image processing. 2006 Jan 16;15(2):430-44.
